North Carolina: Hundreds of Federal Prisoners Legally Innocent, Some Still Incarcerated
by Derek Gilna
Following a 2011 federal appellate court ruling, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) initially tried to delay the release of federal prisoners who were wrongly convicted in North Carolina. The government later announced that it would halt such tactics, but has continued to oppose challenges filed by some offenders who are legally innocent.
The DOJ’s actions followed a review of prosecutions in three federal courts in North Carolina. DOJ spokesman Wyn Hornbuckle said “many more” cases could surface when all of the state’s federal court cases are examined.
The prisoners were convicted of possessing firearms in what the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held was a misapplication of the sentencing criteria, a circumstance unique to North Carolina due to the state’s system of “structured sentencing.” Adopted by the state legislature in 1993, the system mandates that the maximum prison term for any given crime is based on the offender’s criminal record. As a result, sentences for even minor crimes can extend for years if a defendant has numerous prior offenses.
Federal law provides that anyone convicted of a crime punishable by more than a year in ...
Loaded on
April 15, 2014
published in Prison Legal News
April, 2014, page 20
A mentally ill detainee who was placed in solitary confinement in a New Mexico county jail for nearly two years, without adequate medical or mental health care, accepted a $15.5 million settlement for violations of his civil rights.
Stephen Slevin, 59, served almost 22 months in solitary confinement between 2005 and 2007 at the Doña Ana County Detention Center in Las Cruces, New Mexico. On January 24, 2012, a federal jury awarded him $22 million. The award was upheld by a federal judge after county officials challenged it as being excessive, but Slevin decided in February 2013 to accept a $15.5 million settlement and end the legal battle without further appeals.
“It has been a long and hard fight to bring Mr. Slevin justice,” said one of his attorneys, Matthew Coyte. “This settlement, although very large, does not give back to Mr. Slevin what was taken from him, but if it prevents others from enduring the pain and suffering he was subjected to, then the fight has been worthwhile.”
Slevin’s ordeal began on August 24, 2005, when he was booked into the jail on charges of driving while intoxicated and receiving or transferring a stolen vehicle.
“He was driving through ...
Loaded on
Jan. 15, 2014
published in Prison Legal News
January, 2014, page 52
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a district court’s ruling that state corrections employees could be held liable only for their own initial 2- to 3-minute detention of two suspects, and not for further detention that occurred after the suspects were transferred to police custody.
New Mexico Corrections Department employees Gary Carson and Don Mangin were patrolling a high-crime neighborhood with Rio Rancho police officers as part of a task force when they observed Phillip Martinez, Ricardo Sarmiento and a third man outside an apartment building.
When the officers turned on their emergency lights, the third man fled and one of the police officers chased after him. Carson and Mangin drew their weapons and forced Martinez and Sarmiento to the ground, then cuffed and searched them.
Still cuffed, Martinez and Sarmiento were transferred to the custody of other Rio Rancho police officers several minutes later. They were arrested, booked and detained; Sarmiento was held for five hours and Martinez for twelve hours.
Martinez and Sarmiento filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit in federal court against Carson, Mangin and several Rio Rancho defendants, alleging unlawful seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
Denying the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment, ...
Viterbo Liranzo, born in the Dominican Republic, was a U.S. citizen through section 321 of the Immigration and Naturalization Act, which conferred derivative citizenship on children of U.S. citizens. He was required to apply for a certificate of citizenship, but did not do so. Instead, he applied for and received a resident alien card (or “green card”) to remain in the United States. Federal immigration records mistakenly indicated he was a lawful permanent resident.
In 2005, Liranzo was convicted of criminal sale of a controlled substance, a felony, which subjected him to possible deportation. He was detained by immigration agents after he told them he was a citizen of the Dominican Republic, and held in custody for seven months beyond his release date. He was then transported to the Federal Detention Center in Oakdale, Louisiana, where his attorney convinced the government that he was, in fact, a U.S. citizen based on his entitlement to derivative citizenship.
Liranzo exhausted his administrative remedies with the Department of Homeland Security and filed suit in U.S. District Court in New York in 2008, seeking damages for “false arrest and imprisonment” and other tortious conduct. Following two years of discovery, the government raised the defense ...
Loaded on
Aug. 15, 2013
published in Prison Legal News
August, 2013, page 1
On April 9, 2013, Prison Legal News editor Paul Wright sat down with Jeffrey Deskovic as part of PLN's ongoing series of interviews concerning our nation's criminal justice system. Previously, PLN interviewed famous actor Danny Trejo [PLN, Aug. 2011, p.1] and millionaire media mogul and former federal prisoner Conrad Black [PLN, Sept. 2012, p.1].
Jeff Deskovic was 16 years old when he was accused of raping and murdering a classmate, Angela Correa, in Peekskill, New York in November 1989. He was interrogated, polygraphed and threatened by the police for over 7 hours without his parents or an attorney present, and eventually "confessed" to the crime. [See: PLN, April 2011, p.18]. DNA testing revealed that the semen found in the victim's body was not his, yet he was prosecuted anyway based on his coerced confession, convicted of second-degree murder and first-degree rape, and sentenced to 15 years to life in 1991.
Jeff sought post-conviction relief but his appeals were denied; his attorney filed his habeas corpus petition four days late due to misinformation from the court clerk, which led to an appeal to the Second Circuit. Then-circuit court judge Sonia Sotomayor was on the panel that denied his appeal in April ...
A $30,000 settlement was reached in an action filed against the Washington Department of Corrections (D.O.C.) for miscalculation of good-time credits resulting in false imprisonment.
Charles D. Hardt was a prisoner at Airway Heights Correctional Center. With proper calculation of his good-time credit, he should have been released on July 14, 1998. Due to a miscalculation by D.O.C., Hardt was not released until some later undisclosed time, resulting in illegal restraint in violation of Hardt’s due process rights.
Settlement was reached on December 21, 2000, awarding Hardt $30,000 in damages. See: Washington Division of Risk Management claim #31050951
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has held that the overdetention of two prisoners was not due to deliberate indifference on the part of officials at Alabama’s Mobile County Jail. The Court’s ruling affirmed the grant of summary judgment to the defendants.
The 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleged Fourth Amendment violations for the overdetentions of plaintiffs Bentley West and Jerry Rainey. West was incarcerated on November 2, 2002, for a marijuana possession charge. On December 4, a court order lowered his bond, allowing him to execute a signature bond on his behalf. Despite that, he was not released until December 27.
Rainey was jailed on October 31, 2002, on robbery charges. A grand jury no-billed him on March 27, 2003, and a court order to release him was sent to the jail that day. Nonetheless, he was not released until May 24. The Alabama federal district court found the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity.
The defendants fell into two classes: non-supervisory and supervisory. The Eleventh Circuit stated that human error does not equal deliberate indifference. The Court found that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate anything more than their overdetention resulted from negligence or human error.
A common problem ...
Loaded on
July 15, 2013
published in Prison Legal News
July, 2013, page 40
Seventeen Years Pending Re-trial Fails to State Speedy Trial Violation under § 1983
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that a pretrial detainee did not suffer a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial despite being imprisoned for 17 years after a state appellate court reversed his conviction and remanded the case to the trial court.
In 1988, Buxton Craig Heyerman was found guilty in Calhoun County, Michigan of one count of first-degree criminal sexual conduct. He was sentenced to 20 to 40 years in prison, but the Michigan Court of Appeals reversed his conviction on June 8, 1989. Heyerman was advised of the ruling by his appellate counsel, and the trial court and prosecutor were informed by the appellate court the day the opinion was released.
However, nothing further occurred with Heyerman's case until he filed a habeas petition in 2007. Court and prosecutorial officials had no idea the case had slipped through the cracks of the judicial system. In the wake of his petition, Heyerman was appointed counsel and his attorney moved to dismiss the charge on speedy trial grounds. Following a series of hearings, the trial court entered an order on May ...
Loaded on
June 15, 2013
published in Prison Legal News
June, 2013, page 31
In an April 19, 2012 decision, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with a federal district court that Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994) [PLN, Sept. 1994, p.12] barred a Minnesota prisoner's claim that prison officials unlawfully confined him for 375 days beyond his supervised release eligibility date.
In 2002, Brian Lee Marlowe pleaded guilty to first-degree criminal sexual conduct and was sentenced to 108 months in prison, including a term of supervised release.
Several months before Marlowe's December 6, 2007 supervised release date, he was designated a level two predatory sex offender; this required that he serve "intensive supervised release ... [and] a standard condition of intensive supervised release is that the offender live in a residence approved" by the Department of Corrections (DOC).
Prior to Marlowe's supervised release date, he and his prison case manager were unable to find a suitable post-release residence. Marlowe was assigned a supervising agent who picked him up at the prison on his supervised release date. "Marlowe used the agent's cell phone to make a last attempt to find a residence. When Marlowe was unable to find one, the supervising agent took him to the county jail and explained that his ...
The Oregon Court of Appeals held that prison officials are not immune from suit for miscalculating a prisoner's sentence by 13 months.
In 2000, Chester Westfall was convicted of charges in Jackson County, Oregon, and sentenced to 34 months in prison. After escaping in Marion County, Westfall was sentenced to another 20 months in prison.
In 2002, Westfall was convicted of several Josephine County offenses. He was sentenced to 36 months on two counts, consecutive to his other sentences. The court imposed concurrent 13 month sentences on two other convictions.
Eventually, Westfall's 20 month Marion County sentence was vacated on appeal. ODOC then recalculated Westfall's sentences, adding 13 months to his sentence, by incorrectly treating one of his concurrent 13 month Josephine County sentences, consecutively.
After Westfall's release from prison, he sued prison officials in state court for negligence and false imprisonment. The trial court granted Defendants summary judgment, finding that their calculation of his sentences was a discretionary function for which they were entitled to tort liability under ORS 30.265(3)(c).
While ORS 30.265(3)(c) "insulates public bodies from tort liability for acts or decisions that constitute ‘a choice among alternative public policies by persons to whom responsibility for such policies ...