The court of appeals for the Eighth circuit held that a governor's pardon invalidates a criminal conviction in order to permit a 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim for damages to proceed. Johnny Wilson, a mentally retarded Missourian, pleaded guilty to a murder he did not commit in order to avoid the death penalty. After nine years in prison he received a gubernatorial pardon based on his innocence.

Wilson sued various police officials under § 1983 claiming they conducted a biased investigation, intimidated witnesses and provided false information in order to secure his conviction. The district court dismissed the suit, holding that under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364 (1994), the § 1983 claims could not proceed because it would cast doubt on the validity of Wilson's criminal conviction if he prevailed.

The court of appeals reversed and remanded. The court held that for purposes of Heck , a gubernatorial pardon will invalidate and expunge a criminal conviction, thus allowing a § 1983 claim for money damages to proceed. See: Wilson v. Lawrence County, Missouri, 154 F.3d 757 (8th Cir.).

The court of appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that the detention of an individual for 57 days in a county jail on a civil contempt warrant "shocks the conscience" and violates substantive due process. The court further held that this right was clearly established, and the defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity.

On August 17, 1994, a bench warrant was issued for the arrest of sixty-two year-old Walter Armstrong for failure to appear for a contempt hearing regarding child support arrearages. Sheriff's deputies arrived at Armstrong's house on Friday, August 26, to execute the warrant, but they suggested that Armstrong voluntarily surrender on Monday to avoid a "weekend stay" in the county jail.

On Monday, Armstrong reported as proposed, but a series of bureaucratic snafus, beginning with a transposed case number, resulted in Armstrong's continuous confinement well beyond the period normally required to resolve these contempt citations. Although Armstrong periodically protested his confinement, it was not until Armstrong's employer hired an attorney that he gained his release.

Once freed, Armstrong filed a civil rights action in federal court against the sheriff, the jail commander, and three county jail guards in their individual and officials capacities. He also brought ...

Spencer Applied to Parolee's § 1983 Claim

Afederal district court in California held that a state parolee could file suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 challenging his parole revocation and an illegal parole search without first having a favorable ruling on these issues from another court via habeas corpus or direct appeal.

In Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364 (1994) [ PLN , Sep. 1994] the supreme court held that prisoners could not file civil rights suits on issues where a ruling in their favor would cast doubt on the validity of their criminal conviction. This requires that would be plaintiffs must first successfully challenge their conviction or parole revocation in state or federal court and then file suit under § 1983 seeking damages. This doctrine was recently extended to prison disciplinary hearings involving the loss of good time credits. See: Edwards v. Balisok, 117 S.Ct. 1585 (1997) [ PLN , July, 1997]. Heck has also been applied to parole proceedings. See: Butterfield v. Bail, 120 F.3d 1023 (9th Cir. 1997).

In the August, 1998, issue of PLN we reported Spencer v. Kemna, 118 S.Ct. 978 (1998) where the supreme court held that civil rights plaintiffs were ...

Forfeitures: In a federal criminal case the supreme court held that the Excessive Fines clause of the Eighth amendment prohibits "grossly disproportionate" forfeitures of funds. The court held that forfeitures are "fines'' if they are punishment for a crime. The underlying case involved a defendant convicted of taking $357,144 out of the country without reporting it to customs. The district court held that only $15,000 could be forfeited while the government sought to seize the entire amount. The ninth circuit affirmed as did the supreme court. This is the first time the supreme court has applied the excessive fines clause to a forfeiture case. See: United States v. Bajakajian , 118 S.Ct. 2028 (1998).

Parole: The supreme court reversed the Pennsylvania supreme court and held that illegally obtained evidence can be used in parole revocation hearings and the exclusionary rule does not apply. A Pennsylvania parolee's home was illegally searched and weapons were found. The weapons were introduced at a parole revocation hearing. The Pennsylvania supreme court held that illegally seized evidence couldn't be used at parole revocation hearings. See: 698 A.2d 32, 548 PA. 418 (1997). The U.S. supreme court reversed, holding that the exclusionary rule does not apply ...

Fred Zain was a crime lab serologist, who tested evidence for the West Virginia state police from 1979 to 1989, and was chief of serology his last five years. During that time Zain falsified evidence and testified about the results of tests he never performed.

In 1989, Zain took a letter of recommendation from the West Virginia governor and headed to Texas, where he was named head of serology at the Baxter County medical examiner's office in San Antonio. Zain worked there until 1992 when his West Virginia shenanigans came to light. [See: "Fraudulent Police Chemist Flees Justice", PLN Vol. 5, No. 10]

An investigation was triggered by the case of West Virginian Glen Dale Woodall, whose 1987 rape convictions were overturned after DNA tests showed he could not have committed the crime for which he had already served five years. In 1993, the WV supreme court invalidated as many as 138 felony convictions because of evidence tainted or fabricated by Zain. Woodall was awarded $1 million for his false incarceration. William O'Dell Harris, also convicted by flawed testimony from Zain, was later awarded $1.8 million.

In October, 1997, West Virginian Gerald Wayne Davis settled for a reported $650,000 in ...

The district court for the middle district of Florida held that the sheriff, the county and a private corporation operating the county jail were liable for detaining an arrestee for 30 days without a probable cause hearing. The court also held that monetary damages were the proper remedy and that the private operator was not entitled to qualified immunity.

On September 18, 1992, Thomas Blumel was arrested by a Florida sheriff's deputy for allegedly violating a restraining order obtained by his estranged wife as an adjunct to a divorce action. Blumel was booked into the county jail, which was operated by the Corrections Corporation of America (CCA) under contract with the county.

The day after his arrest Blumel was brought before a county judge for a "first appearance," which is normally intended as a probable cause hearing. However, the judge in this instance was not the same judge who issued the restraining order, so he could not rule on the contempt. Blumel was neither released nor offered bail because his arrest was a warrantless arrest.

A month after Blumel was arrested the judge who issued the restraining order finally held a hearing on the matter. As a result the contempt ...

Four civil rights attorneys filed suit against Los Angeles County Sheriff Sherman Block and other officials for falsely imprisoning thousands of people each year by holding them beyond their scheduled release dates. "We intend to seek an injunction under the taxpayer action and force Sheriff Block to stop this wasteful and illegal practice," lead attorney John C. Burton said in an interview with the Los Angeles Times April 25, 1997. Sheriff's officials declined to comment on the allegations, citing the pending litigation.

The Sheriff's Department has quietly admitted it's tracking system for prisoners is obsolete and faulty. By April, some 200 people had been held beyond their release dates in Los Angeles County so far. The Department has been paying departing prisoners held too long in exchange for their agreement not to sue. To date this year, more than $26,000 has been paid to 30 people held an average of 17 days beyond their court ordered release dates according to figures obtained by the newspaper under the California Public Records Act.

The attorneys applied to have the lawsuit certified as a class action and, through court discovery, were working to identify other potential plaintiffs. This is the second such lawsuit ...

In the May and July, 1995, issues of PLN we reported Rooding v. Peters, 876 F. Supp. 946 (ND IL 1994) in which a district court held that res judicata prevented a prisoner from filing suit in federal court for money damages after he had won a writ of mandamus ordering his release from an unlawful sentence in state court.

Ronald Rooding was convicted of criminal damage to property and sentenced to one year in prison. With good time this translated to 92 days of actual imprisonment. When Rooding arrived at an IL DOC facility to serve the sentence he had already served 71 days in jail and thus had 21 days left to serve in the IL DOC. However, an IL DOC policy required that all new DOC commitments serve at least sixty days. This policy, in effect, lengthened Rooding's sentence by 39 days. Rooding filed for a writ of habeas corpus asking for his release after 72 days of captivity. The writ was granted 27 days after he should have been released.

Rooding then filed a class action suit in federal court claiming the 60 day policy violated his right to due process and equal protection. The district ...

The court of appeals for the fifth circuit held that a county was properly liable where it did not reimburse a jail detainee for work he performed on public property. The court also held that a pretrial detainee's work as a trusty does not violate the thirteenth amendment when such ...

A federal district court in Florida held that a private corporation which ran a county jail under contract was liable for a detainee's wrongful imprisonment. Thomas Blumel was arrested without a warrant after being accused of violating a restraining order. Blumel was then placed in the Hernando County Jail which was operated by Corrections Corporation of America (CCA) under contract. After spending the night in jail Blumel appeared before a judge who did not appoint counsel or determine bail, instead the judge said he was in the "wrong court." Blumel spent another 30 days in jail before eventually appearing before a judge who dismissed the charge for lack of evidence and ordered Blumel released. Blumel then sued the county and CCA claiming his right to due process was violated when the county and CCA violated their constitutional duty to ensure that warrantless pre-trial detainees are detained only after a judicial determination of probable cause within the first 48 hours of arrest. He also claimed CCA was liable for negligence and false imprisonment.

CCA filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and the court denied the motion. The court held that jail and prison officials can be ...