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Articles about Wrongful Convictions

Missouri DOC Ordered to Pay Ex-Prisoner $10,600 for Wrongful Imprisonment

On May 20, 2005, a federal jury in Eastern Missouri awarded ex-prisoner, Daryl Davis, $10,600 after corrections officials in that State failed to release him for almost 60 days after his court-ordered release.

Convicted of theft in St. Louis County, Missouri, Davis received a seven-year sentence, which was reversed on ...

Plaintiffs Prevail in Objections to Taxed Bill of Costs

Following their arrest, conviction and imprisonment in 2002, Plaintiffs Kimberly Sykes and Tevya Urquhart, had the convictions overturned on appeal in 2004. Each woman then filed suit against various police officers in 2005 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. sec. 1983 alleging Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment violations. The cases were consolidated in ...

$4,000 Settlement in Failure to Arraign

Washington state’s King County Jail has paid $4,000 to settle the claim of Michael Chiofar, which asserted damages for the failure of the jail to assure that he was arraigned within 72 hours of his arrest as required by Washington law. He claimed that he was arrested on November 28, ...

$15,000,000 Verdict for LA Police Officers Upheld

On July 14, 2008, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld a $15,000,000 verdict for three LA police officers who suffered civil rights violations related to an improper and negligent investigation into the officers’ alleged illegal conduct.

Paul Harper, Brian Liddy and Edward Ortiz sued the City ...

Overdetained California Prisoner Wins $21,800 for False Imprisonment

by John E. Dannenberg

The California Court of Appeal upheld a Superior Court verdict of $21,800 against state prison officials in a lawsuit filed by a prisoner whose eventually-corrected good time credit earning rate resulted in his being released nine months late. Suing under a theory of false imprisonment, he ...

Dismissal of Suit Challenging Loss of Diminution Credits Upheld

On May 8, 2008, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals upheld the dismissal of a prisoner suit challenging the loss of diminution credits.

Alfred Fraction and Gregory Nutter, Maryland prisoners, sued the Secretary of the Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services over the loss of diminution credits following their reincarceration for new offenses. Both Fraction and Nutter had been previously convicted and released on mandatory supervision. When they were returned to custody, the Maryland DOC refused to apply diminution credits earned prior to their release on mandatory supervision. Diminution credits are essentially “good time” credits earned for working and participating in educational programs.

The DOC refused to apply the diminution credits, relying on a Maryland Parole Commission (MPC) policy that prohibits application of such credits to offenders who are reincarcerated. Fraction and Nutter attempted to indirectly attack the MPC policy through the DOC’s refusal to provide the credits.

The court held that the plaintiffs’ challenge was improper because it was the MPC, not the DOC that denied the diminution credits. The court expressed no opinion on the validity of the MPC policy and affirmed the dismissal of the suit. See: Fraction v. Secretary, Department of Public Safety and Correctional ...

Time Spent in Civil Commitment Detention Credited Toward Criminal Sentence

Florida’s Fourth District Court of Appeal has held that there is no meaningful distinction between incarceration in prison or jail and confinement in a sex offender civil commitment facility, for the purposes of sentence calculation.

The Court’s ruling came in a Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.800(a) proceeding, which was dismissed by the trial court, filed by prisoner William J. Sutton. Sutton fulfilled his fifteen year prison sentence and was released under Florida’s Conditional Release Program Act (CRPA), which requires the prisoner to remain under supervision of the Florida Parole Commission for a period of time equal to the gain time awards.

Upon his release, Sutton was transferred to Florida’s civil commitment center for sex offenders to await a trial to have a jury determine whether he qualified for indefinite commitment under the Jimmy Ryce Act (JRA). Under the JRA, the jury must determine if the prisoner is likely to commit new sex offenses, resulting in indefinite commitment upon such a finding.

Thus, upon completion of a prison sentence, prisoners who are deemed to qualify under the JRA pass from criminal to civil commitment. If the jury finds the prisoner is not likely to commit new sex offenses, the prisoner is ...

Court Orders BOP to Recalculate Prisoner’s Good Time

On January 10, 2007, U.S. Magistrate Judge Janice M. Stewart granted a habeas corpus petition filed by a federal prisoner who alleged that the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) miscalculated his good conduct time (GCT).

George Scott Kelly was convicted of felony possession of a firearm in 2003. At the time of Kelly’s sentencing, Kelly had been incarcerated in a California state prison for 28 months on related charges. However, because this time had already been credited against Kelly’s state sentence, the BOP was unable to apply the 28 months toward Kelly’s federal sentence.

To remedy this problem, Kelly’s sentencing judge imposed a sentence of 70 months but reduced the sentence pursuant to United States Sentencing Guideline section 5G1.3 to 42 months to reflect the 28 months BOP would not credit to Kelly’s federal sentence.

Upon commitment to the Federal Correctional Institution in Sheridan, Oregon, BOP calculated Kelly’s GCT based on a 42 month sentence as opposed to a 70 month sentence. Kelly filed a habeas corpus petition challenging the calculation. The court granted the petition, finding that “it is clear that the sentencing judge intended to impose a 70-month term of imprisonment.” Accordingly, the court ordered the BOP to recalculate ...

New York Civil Case Settled in 1977 by Simply Clarifying Rule

A U.S. district court in New York allowed the New York City Police Department (NYCPD) to settle a civil case in 1977 by stipulating and clarifying the NYCPD’s policy on bystanders remaining in the area of an arrest in progress.

Lawyers for both parties agreed that the NYCPD would not admit any violation by any of its employees. According to the order, onlookers shall not be arrested without probable cause. Unless done in a threatening matter, the following are specifically excluded from being deemed probable cause: remaining in the vicinity, speech alone, taking pictures and making note of officers’ names or shield numbers.

If a bystander is taken into custody the arresting officer is required to report it to his supervisor. Upon the issuance of this order, all NYCPD employees were to be made aware of such an order. See: Black v. Codd, USDC, S.D.N.Y., No. 73-Civ-5283.

Eighth Circuit Holds Failure of U.S. Parole Commission to Hold Early Termination Hearing Does Not Make Custody Illegal

The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that 18 U.S.C. sec. 4211(c)(1) creates only a right to an early parole termination hearing, not a right to release in the absence of a timely hearing.

The Court’s ruling came in the appeal of federal parolee Arnold Mitchell, who appealed a Missouri federal district court’s dismissal of a 28 U.S.C. sec. 2241 petition challenging his revocation of probation. Mitchell was convicted in 1988 of federal drug offenses and sentenced to three concurrent 240 month terms of imprisonment and 3 years of supervised release. After serving 102 months, Mitchell was released to parole on March 27, 1997. His parole was scheduled to expire sometime in 2008.

In February 2004, Mitchell was indicted for mail fraud that occurred in 1998. The United States Parole Commission violated Mitchell, rejecting his argument that the revocation was improper because he had not received a 5-year early termination hearing in 2002 under sec. 4211(c)(1).

The Court found that when the House sponsor of the Parole Act spoke, he remarked that “[i]f the Commission fails to act in accordance with these deadlines, the prisoner or parolee would not automatically be released from confinement, but he would compel the ...