The defendants created a training exercise intended to prepare jailers for
a hostage situation, and did entirely too good a job of it, according to
the plaintiff jailers. They enlisted two probationary jailers to play
inmates. They were allowed into the jail even though they were carrying
fake metal guns. They entered the control room and put some staff members
up against the wall, shouted obscenities, pushed other staff members to the
floor, threatened their lives, kicked them, etc., and announced over the
intercom that they had taken over the second floor. Other staff panicked.

The defendants' actions constituted a seizure under the Fourth Amendment,
since the plaintiffs' freedom of movement was terminated from the viewpoint
of a reasonable person. The probation officers' disguise as inmates did
not keep them from being state actors.

The plaintiffs stated a claim under Bell v. Wolfish. The government has a
legitimate interest in preparing its staff for a crisis. However, a
reasonable jury could find that the seizure was excruciatingly long and
subjected the plaintiffs both to intense fear of bodily harm or death and
to the actual possibility that such might occur (apparently because
prisoners might have taken advantage of the situation, ...

After filing suit in August 1997, a juvenile female prisoner who suffered
emotional distress and facial bruising while being forcibly restrained by
personnel at the Marygrove Residential Treatment Facility settled her claim
for $1,000.

The girl had alleged in her suit, filed in St. Louis County, that the
defendants subjected ...

Jail Official Gets Immunity for Delaying Prisoner's Release for One Day

A county prison official was entitled to qualified immunity for delaying the plaintiff's release for a day based on an alleged warrant from Massachusetts that she had not actually seen; her actions probably didn't violate the Constitution, and it certainly wasn't clearly established that it is unconstitutional to detain a prisoner for one day based on a telephone call from law enforcement. See: Wilson v. Zellner, 200 F.Supp.2d 1356 (M.D.Fla. 2002).

The plaintiff prison nurse alleged that, while suffering from a severe bout
of poison ivy and trying to leave for medical treatment, she was "held
hostage" by her supervisor and prevented from leaving the premises.

The supervisor, by instructing an officer not to open the door and by
standing in front of the door, engaged in a seizure of the plaintiff which
was not shown to be reasonable on this summary judgment record. These
facts also support a claim for false imprisonment. See: Barstow v. Shea,
196 F.Supp.2d 141 (D.Conn. 2002).

The plaintiff alleged that he was arrested without probable cause and
subjected to excessive force by the police. He was held for 12 days,
despite his protestations that the warrant on which he was held was for his
twin brother. After he was released, an internal affairs investigation
found the City's policies and procedures had been fully complied with. A
jury exonerated the individual officers but found liability based on a
police department policy, custom, or practice.

The City is free from liability for excessive force as a matter of law
because the officers were exonerated. However, it was properly held liable
for the claims for arrest without probable cause and deprivation of liberty
without due process, since "[t]hese constitutional deprivations were not
suffered as a result of actions of the individual officers, but as a result
of the collective inaction of the Long Beach Police Department." (917)
Id.: "If a plaintiff establishes he suffered a constitutional injury by
the City, the fact that individual officers are exonerated is immaterial to
liability under § 1983." Id. at n.4: "This is true whether the officers
are exonerated on the basis of qualified immunity, because they were merely
negligent, or for other ...

The plaintiffs (196 of them) sought to represent a class of persons
arrested without prior probable cause determinations challenging failure to
provide timely probable cause hearings.

The Supreme Court has said that generally, probable cause hearings should
occur within 48 hours of arrest, but more delay is not necessarily
unconstitutional and less delay may be unconstitutional. The passage of 48
hours shifts the burden to the defendants to justify the necessity of the
detention.

At 183: "When in doubt, a court should err in favor of the maintenance of a
class action." Accord, Rankin v. Rots, 220 F.R.D. 511, 517 (E.D.Mich.
2004). However, this court is troubled by the phrase "prompt probable
cause determination" in the class definition because it is not subject to
objective determination. The plaintiffs also propose seven subclasses,
which "tends to indicate a lack of commonality in the class as a whole. . .
. Although the court has the power to redefine classes or subclasses sua
sponte prior to certification, . . . the court has no obligation to do so,
. . ." and it doesn't, since it doesn't think granting certification would
make the case less unmanageable, and Rule 23 requirements are not ...

The plaintiff complained that he was detained for six months beyond his
maximum release date. His Eighth Amendment claim fails because he does not
show deliberate indifference; the defendant in the prison got to work on
the problem when he was notified about it, and the defendant clerk of court
had no personal involvement in computing time. The fact that the latter
didn't respond to the plaintiff's letter does not establish deliberate
indifference because others (including the other defendant) were available
to address the problem. Due process requires "meaningful and expeditious
consideration of claims that the term of prisoner's [sic] sentence has been
miscalculated" (539); that happened here. See: Royal v. Durison, 319
F.Supp.2d 534 (E.D.Pa. 2004).

The plaintiff alleged that he was held 65 days beyond his release date as a
result of a miscalculation, despite his advising the defendants of their
mistake and requesting that they correct it.

At 720:
Incarcerating a prisoner beyond the termination of his sentence without
penological justification violates the Eighth Amendment prohibition of
cruel and unusual punishment when it is the product of deliberate
indifference. . . . To establish § 1983 liability for incarceration
without penological justification, a plaintiff must establish three
elements. . . . First, he must show that a prison official knew of his
problem and thus of the risk that he was being or would be subjected to
unwarranted punishment. Second, the plaintiff must show either that the
official failed to act or took action that was ineffectual under the
circumstances, thereby indicating that he was deliberately indifferent to
the plaintiff's plight. Finally, the plaintiff must show a causal
connection between the official's conduct and the unjustified detention.
Id. at n.1: The Fifth Circuit has addressed this problem under the
Fourteenth Amendment and not the Eighth Amendment, but it doesn't matter
because the analysis is essentially the same.

The plaintiff also asserted a procedural due ...

The plaintiffs alleged that they were kept past their release dates by the
D.C. Department of Correction; a subclass alleged that they were subjected
to strip searches upon return to jail after judicial determinations that
there was no basis for their detention except to be processed for release.

The court certifies the class. At 32: "Generally speaking, courts have
found that a proposed class consisting of at least forty members will
satisfy the impracticability requirement." The general rule is that
plaintiffs need not provide the exact number of potential class members.

A single common issue meets the commonality requirement. Common questions
include whether the defendant follows the practice of holding persons in
its custody later than their scheduled release date, and whether this
alleged practice violates the Constitution.

A claim meets the typicality requirement if it arises from the same event
or practice or course of conduct as other class members' claims and is
based on the same legal theory. Factual variations do not negate
typicality. Here, varying lengths of excessive confinement (from one to
210 days) do not defeat typicality.

Varying lengths of excessive detention do not establish a conflict of
interest; defendants speculated that those with short periods ...

The plaintiff was denied credit for time served through a record-keeping
error arising from the existence of two indictments for the same criminal
act. A county policy allegedly prohibited staff from counting days for the
same charge under two different court case numbers for jail time credit.

Municipal liability may be established either by showing a policy of
omission, which requires a showing of deliberate difference under Canton,
or by showing that an affirmative policy caused the violation, which does
not require proof of deliberate indifference. The plaintiff's claim is of
the second type so no deliberate indifference showing is necessary for his
Fourteenth Amendment due process claim. However, his Eighth Amendment
claim requires a showing of deliberate indifference under the actual
knowledge standard of Farmer v. Brennan, since that is part of the
substantive cause of action. The evidence does not support that claim,
since there was only one prior incident of similar nature in the preceding
10 years, and no county employee knew that the plaintiff's two cases
involved the same incident early enough to do anything about it.

The plaintiff had "a well-settled Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest in
credit for time served in County custody," but there ...